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In this note I will comment on Frank Arntzenius’s paper “Some problems for conditionaliza-
tion and reflection” [1]. The purpose of that paper was to present various puzzles designed
to show that rational agents can update credences in manners that “violate Bayesian con-
ditionalization and Bas van Fraasen’s reflection principle,” allegedly owing to “the fact
that there are two as yet unrecognized ways in which the degrees of belief of rational
people can develop.” Others (e.g. [2]), in commenting on the paper, have advocated a
conservative position concerning the novelty or significance of these anomalies for rational
action. Although there is nothing particularly new or different here, I’m offering my own
less technical version because I’m not convinced that the objections have been particularly
well understood by philosophers.
First puzzle: the road to Shangri La. You can only enter Shangri La if, after entering,
you don’t remember which of the two paths you took to get there (mountains or sea). So
you conspire with the guardians as follows. First, you flip a coin. If heads, you go by the
mountain path and enter Shangri La normally. If tails, you go by sea and, just as you
cross the threshold, the guardians replace your memory of the journey by sea with a false
memory of a journey by the mountain path. Suppose the coin lands heads. How does your
credence in heads evolve? On the mountain path, it is 1. But later, inside Shangri La,
it is one-half. If credences evolve by conditionalization alone, that can’t happen. That’s
not necessarily very interesting. Obviously we forget things from time to time, and insofar
as we do, our credences evolve in ways other than by conditionalization. According to
Arntzenius, however, this case is more interesting than that, as in the heads scenario, “the
development of your memories will be completely normal.”
The development of one’s memories in this example is perhaps normal in the sense of neural
geometry, but in the functional sense it is not, and that is the sense on which aptness of
the conditionalization paradigm depends. Any system of reliable correlations (strings tied
around fingers, say) can play the memory role, as far as conditionalization is concerned.
On the other hand, if “memoric episodes” lack such correlations, they cannot. In this
puzzle, memoric episodes outside Shangri La as of journeys on the mountain path correlate
perfectly with such journeys, whereas memoric episodes inside Shangri La as of journeys on
the mountain path do not. Obviously the conditionalization paradigm fits at most insofar
as said memoric episodes do correlate with the supposed targets of their intentionality.
The functional role of memory is to establish this correlation, and to the extent that a
candidate mechanism fails to implement this role, its workings don’t constitute memory at
all. The traveler on the mountain path has failed to lay down a neural pattern that will,
inside Shangri La, correlate with having been on the mountain path. Perhaps it was just
impossible or unprofitable for him to do so. Very well...in that case, it was just impossible
or unprofitable for him to remember (in the functional sense). Which means that this
puzzle falls into the uninteresting category of (functional) forgetting.
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Second puzzle: a condemned prisoner is hoping for a stay of his execution. If he is to get it,
a guard will turn a light off at midnight. Otherwise the light stays on all night. At 6 P.M.
the prisoner’s credence in getting the stay is one-half. The prisoner’s cell is not outfitted
with a clock, and his internal clock is imperfect. At 11:59 P.M. it seems likely that he
will assign non-zero probability to it being past midnight. Since the light will still be on,
his credence in the stay will accordingly be, almost surely, less than one-half. Moreover
he knows this in advance. So, at 6:00, E(credence in stay at 11:59) is strictly less than
one-half. This is supposed to be a violation of conditionalization and/or reflection.
It isn’t that.1 Here is the cause of the confusion: all conditionalization says is that the
probability of B, in light of new knowledge A, should be updated to P (B|A) = P (B∩A)
P (A)
.
Conditionalization implies that when one conditions event B on a measurable partition
(that is, updates according to which cell of the partition obtains), the expected proba-
bility of B doesn’t change. The contrapositive of this statement is that if the expected
probability of an event B, conditioned on some measurable partition, differs from P (B),
then conditionalization fails. It does not follow that conditionalization fails if the expected
probability of B one minute before midnight is different from P (B). The paradigm of
conditionalization is a paradigm of rational agency; in order to demonstrate that it fails,
one must give an example in which, in light of new knowledge A, P (B) should be updated
to something other than P (B∩A)
P (A)
. One’s expected credence in B at one minute before
midnight is only relevant, therefore, when knowledge obtained prior to one minute before
midnight is sufficient to determine when it is in fact one minute before midnight (in tech-
nical terms, when one minute before midnight is a stopping time, i.e. when our agent has
it in his power to say stop at that time).
This point may be illustrated by scenarios simpler than that of the prisoner: consider a
two-cell partition {A,Ac}. When I condition P (B) on event A, I update my credence in
1What gives the paradox its kick is that the prisoner’s credence in stay as it evolves
over time should, according to principles of conditioning, be a bounded martingale (Xk).
Then by standard convergence theorems (cf. e.g. [1, Paragraph 278]), if T is a stopping
time (i.e. a random number with event T = k depending only on the prisoner’s evidence
up to and including time k), one must have E(XT ) = E(X0) =
1
2 . This appears to be
violated by taking T = 11:59 P.M. As the theorem is valid, the question arises as to which
hypothesis fails: credence in stay being a martingale or T = 11:59 P.M. being a stopping
time. It is easy to see that the martingale hypothesis fails when k counts out real time but
the prisoner loses track of it, relegating the paradox to the uninteresting case of forgetting,
while the stopping time hypothesis fails when k counts out subjective time, and 11:59
comes as a surprise to the prisoner. If we are not to hold our rational agents to impossible
standards, subjective time makes for the superior model, where expected credence in stay is
indeed 12 conditional on any future subjective time, and the prisoner’s observed decreasing
actual credence in stay is a consequence of conditionalization on the additional evidence
that the light remains on.
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B to P (B|A) = P (B∩A)
P (A) . Similarly when I condition B on A
c, I update my credence in B
to P (B|Ac) = P (B∩A
c)
P (Ac) . So, if I ask whether A or A
c obtains and condition P (B) on what
I learn, my expected credence in B after conditioning is




P (B ∩ Ac)
P (Ac)
= P (B), (∗)
as expected. Consider though a non-uniform protocol whereby if A obtains I will be
informed of this at 11:59, whereas if Ac obtains I will be informed of this at 12:01. At
6:00, what is E(credence in B at 12:00)? If A obtains, I will have learned this by 12:00,
so my credence in B at that time will be P (B|A). If Ac obtains, my credence in B will
be fairly close to P (B), as I will assign high probability, at that time, to the actual time
being before 11:59 (since I haven’t heard anything yet); I won’t update to P (B|Ac) until
12:01, and in the meantime (*) is apt to fail. Is this a violation of conditionalization?
Certainly not...in fact, without assuming that conditionalization is correct, we’d have no
argument that (*) fails! The hypothesis of the theorem about the expected probability of
B staying the same upon conditionalization with respect to a measurable partition simply
hasn’t been met. At least, not with respect to the partition {A,Ac}. At midnight we’ll
be in the process of conditioning on that partition, but may well not have finished. The
puzzle about the prisoner is analogous. If the light goes out at midnight, he finds this out
at midnight. If the light does not go out at midnight, this dawns on him by degrees.
It deserves some discussion how one might formalize a system in which a constant time
turns out not to be a valid stopping time. Usually, one can spot time-valued random
variables that aren’t stopping times a mile away by their indeterminate definitions. Sup-
pose for example I were to search a beach for a lost ring. The search ends when I
find the ring or complete a single pass over the beach. Say my initial credence is 1
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that I will recover the ring. There seems to be very little mystery in the fact that,
at start, E(credence in ring recovered one second before end of search) is substantially less
than one-half. The given time is obviously not a valid stopping time; there is no way for
me to know when it’s exactly one second before the end of my search. By contrast, given
a fixed constant 0 < α < 1, E(credence in ring recovered when proportion α is combed) is
1
2 (it is certainly in my power to yell stop when proportion α has been combed).
How then can the “determinate time” 11:59 be, for the prisoner, more like the indeter-
minate time one minute before end of search than it is like the determinate time when
proportion α is combed? Well, the problem is what one means by determinate time. In
this case, what one should mean is determined by information obtained up to that time,
and by this criterion, of course, 11:59 fails to be a determinate time. A determinate time
for the prisoner, by contrast, would be something like “when my internal clock is centered
on 11:59”. Keep in mind: the beach comber is continually updating his credence in ring
recovered according to the proportion of the beach that has been combed together with
the fact that the ring has not been found, while the prisoner is continually updating his
3
credence in stay according to the center2 of his internal clock together with the fact that
the light is still on. It would be news if there were some state Σ of the prisoner’s internal
clock, conditioned on which his expected credence in the stay were different from one-half.
But of course there is no such state Σ; the prisoner’s expected credence in the stay when
his internal clock is centered on 10:30, or 12:45 or 11:59, is one-half.3
The upshot: though it’s an instructive example, the case of the prisoner is ultimately no
more of a challenge to conditionalization or reflection than are more commonly cited con-
sequences of stopping time protocol violations, such as the fact that my expected balance
at a fair gambling table just prior to my first losing bet is strictly positive.4
Fourth puzzle: Sleeping Beauty. A fair coin is flipped on Sunday night. Beauty’s credence
in heads on Sunday night is 1
2
. She wakes up Monday, is asked her credence in heads, and
if in fact heads obtains that’s the end of the experiment. If tails however, she is put back
to sleep and a drug is administered that erases memory of her Monday awakening. When
she wakes up on Tuesday, she has a subjectively identical experience in which she is again
asked credence in heads. Then that’s the end of the experiment. In any event, Beauty’s
memory of the experiment is erased at the end. Halfers say that since Beauty’s credence
in heads is 12 on Sunday and she doesn’t learn anything new relevant to heads by Monday
morning, her credence in heads should still be 1
2
on Monday. Thirders (most of them) say
that she does learn something new that is relevant to heads (say, for example, that it’s not
the heads Tuesday scenario) when she wakes up Monday, and that, upon conditioning on
this new information, Beauty should assign heads a credence of 13 .
Arntzenius is a thirder, but not a typical one. He says both that Beauty learns nothing
relevant to heads and that Beauty should assign heads a credence of 13 on Monday morn-
ing. And, that this violates both reflection and conditionalization. For an argument, he
imagines a scenario in which Beauty is a lucid dreamer, who, when not awakened at 9:00
A.M., will always dream that she is awakened. She then pinches herself, which hurts if
she is actually awake and which doesn’t hurt (and doesn’t awaken her) if she is asleep. In
this scenario, Arntzenius argues, Beauty should upon pinching herself and finding herself
to be awake condition on elimination of Tuesday heads and update credence in heads to
1
3
. Later in life, Beauty loses the habit of dreaming and at that point knows herself to be
2Also the variance, assuming a normal distribution, of course.
3I am assuming, of course, that the operation of the prisoner’s internal clock is indepen-
dent of the light’s being on or off.
4Arntzenius mentions gambling in regard to this puzzle thusly: “At 6 P.M. you will be
willing to accept a bet on (stay) at even odds, and at 11:59 P.M. you will, almost certainly,
be willing to accept a bet on (no stay) at worse than even odds. And that adds up to a
sure loss. And that means you are irrational.” The status of this passage is unclear to
me (it may be interlocution), but of course in order for a bookie to take advantage of the
prisoner by this series of bets they would have to know when it was 11:59 P.M., and it
isn’t interesting that a bookie who knows more than the prisoner can gain an advantage.
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awake in the morning without the need for a pinch. As her epistemic position now upon
awakening is the same as it was previously after the pinch, her credence in heads should
still be 13 , but this is not arrived at via conditionalization by elimination of alternatives.
As an argument for the one-third solution, this fails, and as an attack on conditionaliza-
tion, fails to avoid falling into the uninteresting case of (functional) forgetting. Beauty
has two valid readings of credence at her disposal, leading to distinct credence functions:
propositional credence and de se credence. Adoption of propositional credence as one’s
subjective credence function in Sleeping Beauty scenarios was developed by David Lewis,
and though it is somewhat counterintuituve, it does cohere with accepted maxims of prob-
ability.5 According to his account, there is an important difference between non-existent
and eliminated alternatives. The “commutativity” argument (if result of evidence is the
same, it doesn’t matter what order it was gathered in) of Arntzenius fails as an argument
against Lewisian halfing because, for Lewis, Dreaming Beauty and Sleeping Beauty don’t
wind up in analogous situations. Dreaming Beauty knows, after pinching herself, that if
heads then she will, tomorrow, again have an experience as of an experimental awakening
(which for Lewis reduces the weight of her current conviction that the coin lies heads),
whereas Sleeping Beauty knows that, if heads, she will not experience any such thing.
As an attack on the conditionalization paradigm, Arntzenius’s one-third solution also
founders, owing to the fact that Beauty functionally forgets that this is her first awak-
ening since Sunday night. That is, she has failed to record a brain state that correlates
reliably with it being such an awakening. If she was prevented from doing so, that’s okay–
all it means is that she was prevented from remembering. So, just as in the Shangrai
La case, where credence in P dropped from one to one-half upon unelimination of a not
P alternative to stand alongside a single P alternative, here credence in Q drops from
one-half to one-third upon unelimination of a not Q alternative to stand alongside a pair
consisting of a not Q alternative and a Q alternative. The only difference here is that the
alternatives are centered worlds, but that doesn’t matter; thirders utilize de se credences,
and de se credences treat centered worlds as propositional credences do uncentered worlds.
Fifth puzzle: Shiva and Brahma. First version. Vishnu tells you that one month ago,
two identical humans, of which you are one, were created by Brahma. At the same time,
Shiva tossed a coin. If it landed heads, Shiva will destroy one of the two humans one
month from now. You are advised to check your mail. If there is a copy of Fred Dretske’s
Knowledge and the Flow of Information waiting for you, you will be destroyed. You check
your mail and find no such book. Your credence in heads is now of course 13 . Second
version. If the coin landed heads, Shiva destroyed one of the humans one week ago. It
wasn’t you obviously, so your credence in heads is again 1
3
. Third version. One of the
humans had existed previously, the other was a duplicate. No difference. Still 1
3
. Fourth
5Although he does not say as much, Lewis plainly views the fact that Beauty experiences
two awakenings in case of tails as a sampling bias (tails worlds are oversampled); his solution
just fixes the bias in the most natural way.
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version. Rather than destroy one of the humans, Shiva, in case of heads, simply prevents
Brahma from creating the duplicate. According to Arntzenius, this makes no difference,
and credence in heads is still 13 . Fifth version. Same as fourth version, but the duplicate
(in case of heads) will not be created until one month from now. Therefore in one month,
you’ll have credence 13 in heads, yet right now you have credence
1
2 in heads. This is
supposed to be a violation of reflection (and conditionalization, presumably).
First, the similarity of the third and fourth versions is contentious; a Lewisian could mark
a difference between destruction and prevention and assign credence 1
2
to heads in the
fourth version. Possibly Lewis would condone such a solution, though there are differences
between this case and that of Sleeping Beauty, where the Lewisian solution compensates for
Beauty’s double tails jeopardy by only counting her estimated credence in heads against her
once, via assignation of half weight to each of her Monday and Tuesday tails awakenings.
That’s a tough sell in version four, as you and your duplicate are probably distinct agents
now. There are however some perspectives that make it plausible (souls are split in two
and thus diminished by duplication, souls aren’t duplicated or split, but who winds up
with them is uniformly random, etc.), so as an argument for a one-third solution, what
Arntzenius has to say may still fail.
Perhaps that’s not so bad. It’s the one-third solution that seems to suffer a violation of
reflection; nor is this seeming violation a great fit for functional forgetting. True, at the
end of the month you can’t remember whether you were a person yesterday or a steaming
vat of organic molecules in Brahma’s laboratory. However, this is an accidental feature of
the puzzle, which could as easily have had it that in one month’s time Shiva destroys you
and creates two duplicates. If these duplicates have forgotten anything now, it would be
difficult to say what. Is this then a novel failure of conditionalization? Not necessarily.
It’s true that before the month is up, you have credence 12 in heads, and after the month
is up, your duplicates have credence 1
3
in heads. But, what if you ceased to exist and your
duplicates aren’t you? Call this identity failure. Identity failure dodges the conclusion
that anyone’s personal credence function was updated in violation of conditionalization by
cogently maintaining that no one’s personal identity function was updated at all.
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